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Executive Summary
Sole [Soles Soles] is a valuable flatfish species that 
lives partly buried in sandy bottoms in the 
western part of the English Channel. Because of 
fairly high catch levels, stock size has fallen sub­
stantially since the late 1970s. Between 1979 and 
2007, the spawning stock biomass [SSB] fell by 
about 40  percent, from 5,400 tonnes to 2,300 
tonnes. This decline represents a substantial dis­
investment in the stock. There are also indica­
tions that the stock is being harvested unsustain- 
ably. A  dynamic bioeconomic analysis showing 
optimal net returns or rents from the fishery 
points to the need for a substantial investment in 
the stock, with the exact magnitude depending 
on the discount rate. For a discount rate of 3.5 
percent, as recommended by the U K  Treasury 
for public investments, the optimal stock level is 
5,114 tonnes. Essentially, then, this recommenda­
tion involves rebuilding the stock to its level 
before the start of the depletion process at the 
end of the 1970s. How quickly the optimal stock 
level is reached depends on how much is har­
vested during the rebuilding period and how 
productive the stock is.
This case study considers four policy options for 
the sole fishery. One option is to allow the situa­
tion prior to the implementation of the European 
Commission's management plan to continue. In 
this case, the stock may be driven to near extinc­
tion over the next few years. Three alternatives 
for stock recovery are also considered. One 
alternative is based on the European Commis­
sion's recently adopted management plan for 
sole. The next alternative involves an annual total 
allowable catch of 5 0 0  tonnes until the optimal 
stock level is reached. Finally, the fastest 
approach involves a moratorium on the harvest 
until the optimal stock level is achieved. Depend­
ing on which alternative is chosen, the optimal 
stock level will be reached between 2011 and 
2020, when higher annual catches will be possi­
ble on a sustainable basis. The sole stock is har­
vested by fishers from the United Kingdom, 
Belgium, and France, with the United Kingdom 
having a 59 percent share. The most important 
fleet segment consists of beam trawlers. A s  part 
of a rebuilding program for the stock, this fleet 
will need to be restructured.
Given the different options for a management 
plan, which one would you choose, taking into 
account both the different values of the resource 
rent and the social costs of reducing fishing 
effort in the implementation phase?
Imagine now that the fishery was in a least- 
developed country, that the data on the fish 
stock were highly incomplete, and that the 
government would have great difficulty in 
actually reducing the fishing effort. How would 
this influence your policy choice? What alter­
native or complementary measures would you 
suggest?
Background
The economic health of global marine fisheries 
has been in alarming decline owing to a combina­
tion of depleted fish stocks, increased fishing 
effort, stagnant or decreasing catches, and over­
capacity of fleets [World Bank 2008], One result 
of the excessive levels of fishing effort is the dis­
sipation of resource rent associated with the fish 
stock, where rent is defined as the surplus of 
revenue over cost of production. In addition, 
where resource rent is not considered explicitly 
and not quantified, the incentive for each fisher 
to attempt to catch fish before others ensures 
that such rent is eventually fully dissipated. 
Hence, understanding the nature and degree of 
rents in fisheries is crucial for designing 
management instruments that achieve sustainable 
exploitation patterns [DFID 2004].
Although rent dissipation is a major concern in 
marine fisheries, studies show that in many 
fisheries worldwide, there is great potential for 
generating substantial rents. The degree to which 
and the rate at which rents are dissipated may 
lead to varying policy incentives. A s  a result, 
identifying the level of potential economic rents 
is important for policy direction.
This case study is on the sole fishery in the 
western English Channel, also known under the 
International Council for the Exploration of the 
Sea [ICES] as Area Vile. Owing to fairly high
catch levels, stock size has declined substantially. 
The spawning stock biomass [SSB] fell by about 
4 0  percent in the period 1979-2007, and there 
are indications that the stock is being harvested 
unsustainably.
Sole [Soled Soled) is a valuable flatfish species that 
lives partly buried in sandy bottoms in the 
western part of the English Channel. Sole spawns 
in spring and early summer in shallow coastal 
waters. The fish become sexually mature at three 
to five years, when they are 25 -35  centimeters 
long, with the males being somewhat smaller than 
the females. Sole can live for more than 40  years, 
but as a result of intense fishing, most sole in the 
western English Channel are less than six years 
old.
Sole is particularly exploited by beam trawlers 
and, to a lesser extent, inshore gill nets. The size 
of the stock fluctuates from year to year owing 
to some particularly productive, but irregularly 
occurring, years for the stock.
Bjorndal and Bezabih [2008] have used a bio- 
economic model to estimate rents and assess 
alternative management paths. The bioeconomic 
model underlying the analysis is based on certain 
simplifying assumptions. One assumption is that 
the fishery is managed by a single owner. In one 
sense this assumption is correct, because total 
allowable catch quotas [TACs] are set at the level 
of the European Union. O n  the other hand, 
T A C s  are divided among several countries, in 
particular the United Kingdom, Belgium, and 
France. This analysis does not consider the impli­
cations of multicountry harvesting for achieving 
an agreement for rebuilding stock and complying 
with quotas, for example.
The second important assumption is that sole is 
treated as a single-species fishery. In reality, how­
ever, sole is part of a multispecies fishery where 
fishing vessels harvest not only sole, but also 
other species, such as monkfish and megrim. 
Although this fact has an impact on both the 
effectiveness of regulations and the cost of har­
vesting, this analysis disregards the multispecies 
aspects of the fishery.
Stock Development and Harvests
The spawning stock biomass increased from
2.800 tonnes in 1969 to a peak of 5,400 tonnes 
in 1979 [Figure 1]. Subsequently there was a 
declining trend in stock size, albeit with periods 
of increasing stock. Stock size in 2007  was 2,270 
tonnes, the lowest level ever recorded. Annual 
harvest increased from 350 tonnes in 1969 to a 
maximum of 1,500 tonnes in 1983. In the period 
1999-2006 annual harvest has varied between 
960  and 1,080 tonnes. There is reason to ask 
whether this harvest level is sustainable.
The reduction in stock level since 1979 represents 
a substantial disinvestment in the stock, and 
stock assessments indicate overexploitation. The 
sole fishery may not be at risk of collapse, but 
proper management is in order.
Regulations
In 2 006  the agreed total allowable catch quota 
[TAC] for Area Vile was set at 940  tonnes— a 10 
percent decrease in fishing mortality compared 
with 2005  [fishing mortality is the rate at which 
the size of a fish stock is reduced due to har­
vesting]. In 2007  the T A C  was set at 9 0 0  
tonnes, representing another 10 percent decrease 
in fishing mortality. The T A C  is shared among a 
number of countries. The United Kingdom has 
the largest share, with 59 percent of the TAC.
In 2007  European Commission [EC] Council 
Regulation No. 509/2007  established a multiyear 
plan for the sustainable exploitation of sole in 
Area Vile. This regulation specifies that a 
recovery plan will take place in the years 2 0 0 7 -  
09 and a management plan will be undertaken in 
subsequent years. For 2 0 0 7 -0 9 , the T A C  is set 
at 20 percent less than the mortality in 2 007  or 
at a fishing mortality rate of 0.27 [whichever 
results in a greater TAC], The T A C  for 2008  
and 2009  is set at 765 tonnes and represents the 
first year of implementation of the long-term 
management plan for the stock. For 2010-12, the 
T A C  would be set at 15 percent less than the 
average mortality during 2 0 0 7 -0 9  or at a 
mortality rate of 0.27 [whichever results in a 
greater TAC]. For 2013-15, the T A C  would be 
set at a mortality rate of 0.27 unless the stock 
has not recovered to a precautionary level of
2.800 tonnes, in which case the formula for 
2010-12 would be applied. Complementary limita­
tions to fishing effort would also be introduced.
F igu re  1: A n n u a l Spaw ning S to ck  B iom ass fSSBJ a n d  Land ings fo r  Sole, 1 9 6 9 -2 0 0 6 [ton n e s]
Source: Compiled based on ICES biomass and catch statistics for sole, 2007.
These T A C s  are considerably higher than those 
recommended by the ICES, which recommended 
a T A C  of 230 tonnes for 2006  and 350 tonnes 
for 2007. The ICES recommended these sub­
stantial reductions in order to reach the biomass 
consistent with the precautionary approach {B A  
in one year. Bpa is estimated to be 2,800 tonnes. 
Stock sizes below this level are believed to 
endanger the future sustainability of the stock.
Current technical measures include a minimum 
landing size of 24 centimeters and a minimum 
mesh size of 80 millimeters for beam trawlers. 
The number of days at sea is restricted to 216 for 
beam trawlers of mesh size equal to or greater 
than 80 millimeters and for static demersal nets 
including gill nets, trammel nets, and tangle nets.
Prices and Costs
O n  the basis of cost data in reports from the 
U K  Seafish Authority for 2001,2004, and 2005, 
Bjorndal and Bezabih [2008] estimated that for 
beam trawlers the cost of harvesting sole is £3 
per kilogram [kg]. This cost per kilogram includes 
variable and fixed costs, including depreciation 
and a normal return on capital.
Average annual prices of sole in the United 
Kingdom for 1984—2006  were obtained from the 
U K  Sea Fisheries Statistics. The nominal price was 
stable at about £3.50/kg in the period 1984—89 
[Figure 2]. Since then the price trend has been 
positive, although prices have declined in some 
years. In recent years the upward trend has been 
particularly strong, with the price rising from 
about £7.00/kg in 2005  to about £8.00/kg in 
2006.
Figure  2 : >4 verage A n n u a l So le  Price, 1 9 8 4 -2 0 0 6
Source: Compiled from DEFRA 1995-2006.
Stock Dynamics
The natural growth function for sole is illustrated 
in Figure 3. The carrying capacity of the stock is 
estimated at 11,214 tonnes (A)- This level is the 
maximum size of the stock and the level it would 
approach under natural conditions— that is, in
the absence of harvesting. The stock level that 
gives rise to the maximum sustainable yield 
[M SY] is 5/507 tonnes, with the M S Y  equal to 
1,116 tonnes. The growth curve is fairly "flat" 
over a range of stock values around Xwsy.
F igu re  3 : N a tu ra l G row th  Fu n ctio n  F (x ) fo r  the Spaw ning S to ck  B iom ass
F(x)
(tonnes)
0 Xmsy= 5,607 K =  11,214
X  (tonnes'!
Note: The natural growth function is a mathematical function describing the relationship between the natural growth of 
a fish stock and the size o f the fish stock, measured either in biomass weight [tonnes] or numbers of fish.
Source: Author.
Table 1: Estim ates o f  O p tim a ISSB  a nd  Harvest fo r D ifferent D iscount Rates
Discount rate 
(% ]
Biomass
[tonnes] Harvest [tonnes]
0 5,607 1,116
3.5 5,114 1,107
5.0 4,903 1,098
10.0 4,198 1,045
20.0 2,790 834
Source: Author's calculations.
Table 1 presents estimates of the optimal biomass 
and corresponding harvest for discount rates 
between 0  and 20  percent. It is here assumed 
that the fishery is managed by a single owner 
whose objective is to maximize the net economic 
returns [or rents] from the fishery.
Optimal SSB varies between about 5,600 tonnes 
[discount rate =  0] and about 2,800 tonnes [dis­
count rate = 20  percent], with the correspond­
ing annual harvest varying between about 1,100 
and 800  tonnes. The optimal harvest does not 
change much for discount rates between 0  and 
10 percent because of the curvature of the esti­
mated growth function, as already noted.
Recent decades have seen a substantial disinvest­
ment in the spawning stock biomass, from 5,400 
tonnes in 1979 to 2,300 tonnes in 2007. The 
bioeconomic analysis presented here calls for a 
substantial investment in the stock. The exact 
magnitude of the investment depends on the dis­
count rate. For a discount rate of 3.5 percent, as 
recommended by the U K  Treasury for public 
investments, the optimal stock level is 5,114 
tonnes. Essentially, this recommendation calls for 
the stock to be rebuilt to its level before the 
start of the depletion process at the end of the 
1970s and early 1980s.
Investing in the stock means that harvests must 
be reduced below natural growth for a period of 
time to permit the stock to grow. Once the 
stock has increased to its optimal level of 5,114 
tonnes, annual harvest can be increased to a 
sustainable level of 1,107 tonnes.
Policy Issues
The bioeconomic analysis has some important 
policy implications. First and foremost, there 
should be substantial investment in the stock to 
allow it to grow to an optimal level. Essentially, 
the stock depletion that has been taking place 
since 1979 should be reversed, by reducing har­
vests, and the stock rebuilt to its level before the 
start of the depletion process. Policy makers 
must determine how much should be invested 
and how fast— that is, over what time period—  
the investment should take place.
In the short run, investing in the stock will 
necessarily mean reducing harvests and lead to 
lower revenues for fishing fleets. In the long run, 
when the stock has been rebuilt, harvests can 
increase to a higher level. This approach involves 
short-run sacrifices for long-run benefits. The 
"short run" may amount to several years, how­
ever, and it may be difficult for fleets to sustain 
reductions in income, even if they are temporary. 
Yet the sole fishery has the potential to yield a 
fairly substantial resource rent. With proper 
stock management, after a rebuilding period the 
fishery could be reopened, allowing for higher 
catches and revenues on a sustainable basis.
To achieve the optimal level of rent, not only 
would the stock need to be allowed to grow to 
the optimal level, but the fleet would also need 
to be restructured to reduce excessive fishing 
effort and harvesting costs. A  more thorough
analysis of this issue would require more detailed 
effort and cost data.
Sole represents the most important output of the 
U K  beam trawler fleet. Although sole represents 
only a little less than 10 percent of catch 
quantity, it accounts for close to 30  percent of 
catch value. Yet according to Bjorndal and 
Bezabih [2008], this fleet currently earn no rents, 
but rather is incurring losses. The reason this 
situation continues must be that the capital in the 
vessels can be considered a "sunk cost" with 
little, if any, alternative value. Thus, vessels can 
keep fishing as long as revenues cover variable 
costs, including maintenance of gear and vessel. 
This situation is not uncommon in fisheries.
In the long run, however, the situation is not 
sustainable. Sooner or later vessels will need to be 
replaced, but fleets can replace their vessels only 
if their economic situation changes considerably. 
Presumably this change can take place only after 
a substantial restructuring of the fleet, including 
a substantial reduction in fleet capacity.
Some of the simplifications made in this analysis 
also have policy implications. Sole is part of a 
multispecies fishery. Fishing vessels harvest sole 
at the same time as they harvest other species 
like monkfish and megrim. This fact has an 
impact on both the effectiveness of regulations 
and the cost of harvesting. This analysis assumes 
that sole is a single-species fishery, and although 
impacts on other fisheries are difficult to quan­
tify, they need to be considered.
Another assumption is that the fishery is 
managed by a single owner. This analysis does 
not consider the implications of multicountry 
harvesting for achieving an agreement for 
rebuilding the stock and complying with quotas, 
for example. A s  noted, the major countries 
participating in this fishery are the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, and France. For all countries 
participating in the fishery, improved manage­
ment brings with it the promise of increased 
harvests, revenues, and rents.
Because fish cannot be easily observed, assessing 
stock size is a challenging task for fisheries 
scientists. Over the years, they have developed 
sophisticated statistical methods and combined 
results from these models with analyses based on 
acoustic surveys. Although there is uncertainty
about the precise stock size, stock data for sole 
are good.
The situation in developing countries may be 
very different. In many of these countries, exper­
tise in fisheries science is limited, data collection 
is inexistent or inconsistent, and the national 
fisheries administration is frequently understaffed 
and underfunded. In addition, access to fisheries 
is often unregulated, with limited government 
control over the actual fishing effort and few 
incentives for fishers to limit their catches to 
what would be sustainable in the long term. 
Moreover, fisheries are typically mixed, so that 
fishers at any time may harvest fish from many 
different stocks, in some cases 2 0 - 4 0  different 
stocks. In a situation like this, assessing stock is 
infinitely more difficult, and as a consequence 
fisheries management in many developing coun­
tries is at best very limited and at worst 
nonexistent.
Stakeholders
A  number of stakeholders can be identified.
The European Commission
The European Commission sets T A C s  and other 
regulations, after consultation with the national 
governments involved and based on advice from 
the ICES. Thus, the European Commission has a 
central role in the overall management of the 
fishery.
UK and Other National Governments
National governments also play an important role 
in the case of sole— particularly the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, and France. Ultimately, they 
need to agree on T A C s  and regulations to be 
implemented by the European Commission. 
Monitoring and enforcement of the regulations 
is the responsibility of the United Kingdom and 
other governments. Thus, the effectiveness of 
regulations is largely determined by the countries 
involved.
The UK Beam Trawler Fleet and UK 
Inshore Fleet
A s  already noted, the U K  beam trawler fleet is 
the most important fleet segment in this fishery, 
not only in the United Kingdom, but overall. 
Sole represents the most valuable output for this 
fleet. Moreover, beam trawlers currently earn no 
rents; if anything, they are incurring losses. Thus, 
a restructuring of the fleet is called for, with 
some of the current operators in all likelihood 
having to leave the fleet over the next few years. 
The U K  quota is shared between the beam 
trawler fleet and the inshore fleet. Thus, if one 
fleet gets more of a given quota, it will happen at 
the expense of the other fleet.
Belgian and French National Fleets
N o  information is available regarding other fleet 
segments in the sole fishery, but there is no 
reason to believe that the Belgian and French 
fleets currently earn positive rents.
Policy Options
The 2007  SSB level was 2,300 tonnes. A n  opti­
mal policy will involve an investment in the stock. 
This analysis assumes that the discount rate is 3.5 
percent, which will imply more than a doubling 
of the stock to 5,114 tonnes.
Different approach paths can be pursued to reach 
this stock level. How quickly the optimal stock 
level will be reached depends on how much is 
harvested during the rebuilding period and how 
productive the stock is. The first option is a con­
tinuation of the situation prior to the implemen­
tation of the European Commission's recently 
adopted management plan. The second option is 
based on the European Commission's manage­
ment plan for sole. The third option involves an 
annual T A C  of 5 0 0  tonnes until the optimal 
stock level is reached. The fourth option, known 
as bang-bang, is most extreme approach path and 
involves a moratorium on the harvest until the 
optimal stock level is achieved.
Option 1: Continuation of the 
Pre-Management Plan Policy
If regulations prior to the implementation of the 
European Commission's management plan were 
not changed, the stock would be subjected to a 
constant yearly harvesting of 958 tonnes, which 
is the actual harvest recorded in 2006. 
Consideration of the impact of this management 
approach commences at the end of 2007. The 
results show that the stock would have been 
driven to extinction by the year 2011— that is, 
after four years [Figure 4], This outcome may be 
a bit of an exaggeration, given that catch per unit 
of effort may have declined as stock size was 
reduced, making stock depletion less severe. 
Nevertheless, this result clearly shows that if 
nothing had been done, the stock would have 
been driven to near extinction.
Option 2: The EC Sole Management Plan
The second approach is based on the manage­
ment plan introduced by the European Commis­
sion for Western Channel sole. In the first two 
years of the recovery period, 2008  and 2009, 
the T A C  was set at 765 tonnes. The T A C  is then 
reduced to 6 0 0  tonnes per year until 2012. In 
2013 the T A C  is further reduced to 550 tonnes 
and maintained at this level until the steady-state 
stock level has been achieved [Figure 4]. In 2020, 
the last year before a steady state is reached, the 
T A C  is set at 868 tonnes.
Option 3: Constant 500-Tonne TAC
The next case assumes an annual T A C  of 5 0 0  
tonnes until the steady state is reached. This 
value is chosen arbitrarily— it is less than the 
T A C s  of recent years, but more than what the 
ICES has recommended. The reason for con­
sidering this approach path is that the closure of 
the fishery would be a draconian measure that 
might impose substantial social costs on the 
fishers affected.
The approach to a steady state is illustrated in 
Figure 4. The 500-tonne quota remains in effect 
for the period 2007-12, each year giving rise to 
some revenues. In 2013 the quota is reduced to 
407  tonnes so that the steady state can be 
achieved starting in 2014 with an annual harvest 
of 1,107 tonnes. Thus, this approach reaches a 
steady-state stock level three years later than the 
fastest approach.
F igu re  4: A lternative  Future Paths fo r  SSB, 2 0 0 7 -2 3
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—^ -5S B  under Bang-Bang 
Approach
— 5SB under Constant 500- 
TonneTAC
-^ -S S B  under EC Sole 
Management Plan
— 5SB under Pre-Management 
Plan Policy
year
Source: Author's calculations.
Option 4: The Bang-Bang Approach
Under the fastest approach to the steady state—  
the "bang-bang" approach— the fishery is closed 
as of 2008  and remains closed through 2010. A t  
the end of 2011, 853 tonnes will be harvested to 
get the stock to its steady-state level of 5,114 
tonnes. Thereafter, this approach allows for a 
steady-state T A C  of 1,107 tonnes [Figure 4]. 
Thus, if the fishery is properly managed, the 
fishery can yield a rent [or surplus] on a sustain­
able basis. The short recovery period under this 
approach is a consequence of the good growth 
rate for sole.
Comparison
It is obvious that the size of the T A C  during the 
rebuilding period has a great influence on how 
soon the steady-state stock level is reached. 
Under the fastest approach, the fishery is closed 
through 2010, and the steady state is reached in 
2011. With a 500-tonne T A C  during the 
rebuilding period, the steady-state harvest is 
allowed from 2014. In the case of an approach 
path based on the current management plan, the 
steady state is reached in 2021— 10 years later 
than under the fastest approach.
E st im a t io n  of Rent
For estimates of the present value of rents, it has 
been assumed that the price of sole is £8/ kg and 
that the cost of harvesting is £3/kg. This cost 
per kilogram includes variable and fixed costs, 
including depreciation and a normal return on 
capital. The difference between the price and the 
cost of production is called resource rent. Rent 
can be considered a return on the stock of fish 
as a factor of production. Thus, the sole fishery 
produces a rent of £ 5 /kg. Rents have been dis­
counted to 2007.1 Here is how the present value 
of rents over time is calculated.
The present value of rents from the sole fishery 
has been estimated for all four alternatives [Table 
2]. The starting point for these calculations is 
assumed to be the 2007  situation, with an SSB of 
2,300 tonnes. The calculations are based on a 
discount rate of 3.5 percent, involving an optimal 
stock level of 5,114 tonnes and a steady-state 
annual harvest of 1,107 tonnes.
i Thus, rents in 2008 are discounted one year; rents in 
2009, two years; and so on.
Table 2  Present Value o f  Rents [ w ith a 3 .5  percen t d isco u n t rate]
Approach
Present value 
[million £]
Option 1: Continuation of pre­
management plan policy
20.0
Option 2: The EC  sole management 
plan
65.0
Option 3: Constant 500-tonne T A C 137.0
Option 4: Bang-bang 140.0
Source: Author's calculations.
Continuation of the pre-management plan policy 
gives rise to a present value of rents of £20  
million. Fairly high rents are achieved in the first 
few years of the period, while the stock is being 
driven to extinction.
The approach path based on the current EC 
management plan for sole gives a present value 
of £65 million. The "advantage" of this scenario 
is that it generates fairly high harvests and rents 
also while rebuilding the stock, but this result 
comes at the expense of delayed attainment of 
the steady state. The net result is a much lower 
present value than for the faster approach paths.
The case of a 500-tonne T A C  in the rebuilding 
period allows for rents to be earned during 
rebuilding. It does, however, take longer than the 
bang-bang approach to reach the steady state, 
when annual rents will rise. This approach there­
fore represents a trade-off. The present value of 
rents for this alternative is £137 million, slightly 
less than for the bang-bang approach.
In the case of the bang-bang approach, as illus­
trated in Figure 4, no harvests will take place in 
the two-year period 2008 -09 . Thus, in these 
years the fishery will produce no revenue and 
generate no rent. The situation changes in 2010, 
when 853 tonnes are harvested. With a rent of 
£5/kg, the total rent will be £4,265 million. If 
the fishery is managed on a sustainable basis, as 
of 2011 the annual harvest level will be 1,107 
tonnes and the associated rent of £5,535 million 
will be obtained annually ad infinitum. The 
present value of this stream of rents, measured as 
of 2007, is £140 million.
This estimation of rents leaves out several rele­
vant matters. With a continuation of current 
policy, the stock could be driven to extinction. A  
fish stock, like any other biological resource, has 
an existence value, which the present analysis 
does not consider.
Under the fastest approach, the fishery is closed 
for three years. Fishers may be unemployed for 
parts of that period, a situation that would 
involve social costs. Moreover, without revenues 
from the sole fishery, some fishers may be driven 
to bankruptcy while waiting for the stock to 
recover.
Price is assumed to be constant regardless of 
quantity. Scenarios with a lower annual TA C , 
such as 5 0 0  tonnes per year, could involve a 
higher unit price than what is obtained when the 
fishery is in its steady state, because the price is 
likely to depend on quantity supplied.
Additional Readings
Bjorndal, T., and M. Bezabih. 2008. The eco­
nom ic benefits o f fisheries management: 
A sse ssing potential econom ic rents in sea 
fisheries: The case o f Western Channel sole. 
London: Department for Food, Environment, 
and Rural Affairs [DEFRA], 
http: / / www.defra.gov.uk/ marine / pdf / fisheri 
es / 200805econ-fishman-case.pdf
DFID [U K  Department for International Devel­
opment]. 2004. Resource rents. Key Sheets 
on Fiscal Reform in Fisheries No. 2. London.
http://www.kevsheets.org
References
Bjorndal, T., and M. Bezabih. 2008. The eco­
nom ic benefits o f fisheries management: A s ­
sessing potential econom ic rents in sea 
fisheries: The case o f Western Channel sole. 
London: Department for Food, Environment, 
and Rural Affairs [DEFRA]. 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/marine/pdf/fisheri 
es / 200805econ-fishman-case.pdf
Clark, Munro, and Associates. 2007. Impacts of 
harvesting rights in Canadian Pacific fisheries. 
Report to the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans, Ottawa, Canada.
DEFRA  [U K  Department for Food, Environment, 
and Rural Affairs], 1995-2006. Econom ics 
and statistics annual reports, 1995-2006. 
London.
DFID [U K  Department for International Devel­
opment]. 2004. Resource rents. Key Sheets 
on Fiscal Reform in Fisheries No. 2. London. 
http: / / www.kevsheets.org
F A O  [Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations]. 1995. F A O  code o f conduct 
fo r responsible fisheries. Rome.
Grafton, R. Q., H. W. Nelson, and B. Turris. 
2007. Resolving the class II common 
property problem: The case of the BC 
groundfish trawl fishery. In T. Bjorndal, D. 
V. Gordon, R. Arnason, and R. Sumaila, ed., 
Advances in  the econom ics o f  the fishery: 
Festschrift in  honour o f  Professor C. R. 
M unro. Oxford: Blackwell.
W orld Bank. 2008. The sunken billions: The eco­
nom ic justification fo r fisheries reform. 
Washington, DC.
